The first 125 refugees arrived at Eglin AFB from Key West, Florida, on May 3, 1980. By May 11, 10,025 refugees had flowed into Eglin AFB and been in-processed. The refugees received meals, clothes, medical attention, and sleeping accommodations. During this time, Immigration and Naturalization Services, Public Health, investigative agencies, and placement agencies eventually out-processed the refugees. Immigration and naturalization processing continued 24 hours a day until the last Cuban completed the tedious process. Crowded conditions and the slow pace of out-processing, due to the need for immigration clearance security checks, delays in public health screening, and setbacks in the placement process (sponsors were slow in coming to the camp), led to discontent among the refugees. On May 24, the refugees staged a hunger strike. Later in the day, 200 to 300 Cubans jumped the fences and threw bricks and stones at the security police. Security police restored order after reinforcements arrived from Hurlburt Field and Eglin, but the slow out-processing and crowded conditions continued to vex officials.15 Gen. Alton D. Slay, Commander of AFSC, expressed his concern regarding the slow out-processing pace of the refugees to the CSAF.
“We have processed over 10,000 in and only 97 out. On the other hand, over 13,500 have been processed out at Miami. This disparity of out-processing effort is not understood by the local residents around Eglin nor by me. Also, the refugees at Eglin are becoming visibly more restive,” he said. “I’ll say it again Chief: our people are doing the very best job possible under extremely adverse circumstances. Those circumstances are just bound to become more and more adverse with each passing hour unless the logjam in out-processing is broken. If that logjam cannot be broken, I again urge in the strongest possible terms that a civilian law enforcement agency move in quickly to take charge of internal security in the camp.”16
To head off future riots, on May 29, U.S. Marshals assumed responsibility for internal security.17 Eventually the pace of out-processing picked up and Eglin officials recommended the closure of the center and the relocation of the refugees. They determined it was no longer economical to maintain the processing center. On August 5, a White House representative announced the selection of Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, as a consolidation location for Cuban refugees. By September 24, only 619 refugees remained. On September 26, the last of the refugees departed for Fort Chaffee and the Cuban Refugee Processing Center closed. In October, the U.S. government and Cuban government mutually agreed to end the exodus. On October 9, Special Order G-125 inactivated the Support Squadron Provisional, 3250th, Eglin AFB, Florida (the Air Force designation for Cuban Refugee Processing Center), effective October 15.18
Operation RED, WHITE, AND BLUE, “was the Air Force[’s] successful effort with little forewarning to utilize military expertise for a humanitarian mission and coordinate actions with other government and civilian nongovernmental organizations.”19 The major focus of the effort was construction, namely the construction of tents, but the operation also focused on the installation of communications, recruitment of military and civilian personnel, security, and logistical support for in-processing, housing, and out-processing the newly arrived refugees. It demonstrated how the Air Force could successfully respond to a humanitarian crisis.
Questions to Think About:
What were the lessons learned from the Mariel Boatlift? How were they applied?
Recommended Readings:
3201st Air Base Group (3201 ABG) Office of History, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 1 May 1980-26 September 1980, (Eglin Air Force Base, 3201 ABG, Dec 1980).
Kathleen Dupes Hawk, Robin Villella, Adolfo Leyva de Barona, Florida and the Mariel Boatlift of 1980: The First Twenty Days, (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 2014).
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Endnotes
1) Dan Williams and Barbara O’Reilley, “New Wave of Refugees Rolling In,” The Miami Herald, 6 May 1980, 1.
2) Ibid.
3) According to the Castro regime, the guards “protected” the embassy. Under Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, “the receiving State [in this case Cuba] is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity” per the following: Report, United Nations, “Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,” 18 April 1961, 7. However, a New York Times article dated 6 April 1980 stated that, “previously, the Peruvian Embassy…had been guarded by officers of the Interior Ministry carrying machine guns” per the following: Jo Thomas, “2,000 Who Want to Leave Cuba Crowd Peru’s Embassy in Havana,” New York Times, 6 April 1980, 2.
4) 3201st Air Base Group (3201 ABG) Office of History, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 1 May 1980-26 September 1980, (Eglin Air Force Base, 3201 ABG, Dec 1980), 1-4, 39; Website, This Day in History, “1980 Castro Announces Mariel Boatlift,” https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/castro-announces-mariel-boatlift (accessed on 5 November 2018); “Peru’s Embassy in Havana,” 2.
5) Website, Moments in US Diplomatic History: A Flood of Cuban Migrants-The Mariel Boatlift, April-October 1980,” https://adst.org/2015/04/a-flood-of-cuban-migrants-the-mariel-boatlift-april-october-1980/ (accessed on 9 November 2018).
6) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 4.
7) This Day in History.
8) Kathleen Dupes Hawk, Robin Villella, Adolfo Leyva de Barona, Florida and the Mariel Boatlift of 1980: The First Twenty Days, (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 2014), 125.
9) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 2; This Day in History.
10) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 3-5, 41; Message, CSAF/CVA to ALZICOM-SOA/CC, et al., “Cuban Refugee Support,” 1 May 1980; Message, HQ USAF/XOO to AFSC/CC, et al., “Cuban Refugee Support,” 1 May 1980; Message, HQ DA/DAMO-ODS, “CONUS Support of Cuban Refugee Situation,” 6 May 1980.
11) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 3, 14-15.
12) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 6-33, 217-244; Memo, HQ AD/DE to 3201 ABG/HO, “Reports on Cuban Refugee Operations at Eglin AFB (Your Letter 9 Oct 80),” 1 Dec 1980; Memo, HQ 3201 ABG/SV to 3201 ABG/HO, “Reports on Cuban Refugee Operations at Eglin AFB (Your Letter 9 Oct 80),” 23 Oct 1980.
13) Website, National Archives-The Unwritten Record, “From Mariel Harbor to Eglin Air Force Base: Cuban Refugees and the Mariel Boatlift,” https://unwritten-record.blogs.archives.gov/2015/09/08/from-mariel-harbor-to-eglin-air-force-base-cuban-refugees-and-the-mariel-boatlift/ (accessed on 8 November 2018).
14) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, iii, 6-33, 307-337; Memo, 3201 ABG/DP to 3201 ABG/HO, “Reports on Cuban Refugee Operations at Eglin AFB (Your Letter 9 Oct 80),” 24 Oct 1980; Memo, HQ 3201 ABG/DAR to 3201 ABG/HO, “Printing Support for Refugee Camp,” 24 Oct 1980; Memo, HQ AD/LGMA to 3201 ABG/HO, “Reports on Cuban Refugee Operations at Eglin AFB (Your Letter 9 Oct 80),” 21 Oct 1980; Memo, HQ 3201 ABG/DW to 3201 ABG/HO, “Reports on Cuban Refugee Operations at Eglin AFB (Your Letter 19 Jun 80),” 2 Jul 1980.
15) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 32-33, 58, 63, 73-75, 78, 152, 155, 158, 162, 167, 320-321; National Archives-The Unwritten Record, 4.
16) Message, AFSC/CC to CSAF/CC, “Refugee Situation at Eglin,” 14 May 1980.
17) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 78-79.
18) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, 133-134; Message, HQ AFSC/TE to HQ USAF/XOO, et al., “Cuban Refugee Support,” 26 Jun 1980; Message, HQ DA//DAMO-OOS to AIG 9180, “Cuban Camp Consolidation,” 7 Aug 1980; Message, AD/CV to HQ USAF/XOO, et al., “Cuban Refugee Support Final Sitrep,” 27 Sept 1980; SO G-125, HQ AFSC, 9 Oct 1980; This Day in History.
19) 3201 ABG, Operation Red, White, and Blue, iii.